Contingency fee is one of the common institutions of common law legal system particularly in the united state. In this type of fees, the payment of fee is Conditional to the results of lawsuit. So if the lawsuit fails, no fee would be paid to the lawyer and if the lawsuit is successful, more than usual amount or a pecent of condemned amount will be paid. Despite accepting theses agreement in some legal systems, there are some limitations in order to make conformity with their own legal system which make different, the importance and functions of it in compare with the U. S. In some legal systems, other institutions with the same function are predicted too. In Iran legal system, despite of freedom of contract, according to article 80 of the law of attorney regulations, a type of contingency fees which is a part of a demand are prohibited. This paper with a comparative attitude and with insisting on U. S legal system and clarifiying the Conditional and contingency fees and its advantages and disadvantages, defend the accepting of it in Iran legal system.

We investigate the association between managerial overconfidence and audit fees, as well as the effect of a strong audit committee on this relation. Overconfident managers tend to overestimate their ability and the future payouts of projects but underestimate the likelihood and impact of adverse events. Auditors may therefore charge a fee premium to compensate for the additional audit effort due to the increased audit risk. Conversely, overconfident managers may demand less audit services due to either hubris in their companies’ financial reporting or a desire to reduce auditor scrutiny over aggressive accounting. A strong audit committee can alleviate the audit risks associated with managerial overconfidence or prevent overconfident managers from reducing audit services thus mitigating the relation between audit fees and managerial overconfidence. We survey 73 companies in Stock Exchange in the year’ s 1384 to 1393 find that a negative relation is between managerial overconfidence and audit fees. In addition, a strong audit committee also can’ t reduce this negative effect.

With this structural change in the audit market of Iran, the effect of the Auditor Type (governmental and private) on the audit fee stickiness has not been investigated so far. Therefore, in this research, we seek to investigate the effect of auditor type on audit fee stickiness. In order to answer the research question (does the type of auditor, i.e. public or private, have an effect on the stickiness of audit fees?),the data of 311 firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange and the OTC market (Fara Bourse) is extracted and analyzed for the period 2012-2020 (1,753 firm-years). To test and check research hypotheses, the results of multiple regression were analyzed. The results of the data test indicate that in companies with a government audit institute, compared to companies with a private auditor, the downward audit fee stickiness is lower than the upward audit fee stickiness. In other words, the audit organization has a greater tendency to reduce the audit fee (at the time of decreasing changes) than to increase the fee (at the time of increasing changes). Moreover, additional tests indicate that, in Iran, downward fee stickiness is generally lower than upward fee stickiness, which indicates the existence of lowballing in the Iranian audit market. These findings highlight the value in addressing the issue of audit fee stickiness, as audit fee is a controversial topic in the accounting profession. The evidence indicates the important role of the type of auditor (governmental or private) in the audit fee stickiness.

The amount of audit effort and, consequently, audit fee of companies is affected by the type of Business strategy. A review of the business strategy and its relation to auditors' efforts in the context of Standard No. 11 of the Audit Supervisory Board refers to the need for auditors to have adequate knowledge of the business and industrial environment of the client for the planning of the audit work. In this regard, the main objective of this research is to investigate the relationship between the type of business strategy of the client and the audit fee of the companies. Following the researches of Mills and Snow (1978, 2003), in this research, indicators of capital intensity, renovation of property and equipment, overhead efficiency and financial leverage were used for determining the type of client business strategy (aggressive strategy and defensive strategy). The statistical population of this research is the companies accepted in the Tehran Stock Exchange during the years 1387 to 1394 and the sample size is 680 observations (year-company). The results of the data analysis show that there is a positive (direct) correlation between the client's aggressive strategy and the audit fee. These results also show that the aggressive strategy has a more positive correlation with audit fee compared to the defensive strategy.

fee splitting, a clear manifestation of physician's breaching patient' s rights, is the breach of the principle known asbona fide with regard to the patient and the dominance of physician's financial interest on facilitation of treatment process. Yet a question is posed: Can physician's abusing patient's trust or lacks of information, whose manifestation can be observed in fee splitting, justify the necessity of criminalizing fee splitting? In fact, the point of argument is to criminalize or decriminalize fee splitting. Some patients have exposed to high cost of treatment without any medical necessity. Accordingly, the authors of this writing try to identify the necessity of providing criminal protection for this group of patients through studying the arguments posed by advocates of fee splitting and those posed by opponents. This writing then deals with constituent elements of fee splitting and studies necessary principles and features to commit this crime from the viewpoint of teachings of medical criminal law.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between audit fee stickiness and audit error. For this purpose, a sample of 274 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange and OTC, for a period of 9 years 2012-2020 (1455 companies-year) and selected as an unbalanced panel have been selected. The hypotheses were also tested using multivariate regression. The results showed that with increasing adhesion in the upward correction as well as adhesion in the downward correction, the error of the second type of audit will not change significantly. However, less stickiness in the upward correction leads to a reduction in the Conditional audit report and an increase in the quality of the audit. Less stickiness in downward correction is also positively associated with restatement of financial statements. However, less stickiness in the upward correction leads to a reduction in the Conditional audit report and an increase in the quality of the audit. Less stickiness in downward correction is also positively associated with restatement of financial statements.

Using variables such as client size, complexity, risk, internal auditor, auditor size, and industry, empirical research explains price behaviour of audit fees, and often attributes this pattern to audit fee model. Our study helps to explain why the audit fee model does not fully explain the level of audit fees, because it does not take account of fee stickiness and the influence of previous fees. This paper examines the audit fee stickiness in Iranian firms, using panel data analysis. The sample is comprised of 79 publicly traded firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) using object oriented sampling method. Using data for 1386-1392, we find evidence that audit fees are sticky, i.e. they do not fully adjust to the levels predicted by a standard audit fee model. Audit fees also go up more quickly than they come down. We also find that the difference between upward and downward audit fee adjustments reduces in the second year and when longer periods of time are aggregated. Furthermore the results show that changing auditors has no effect on audit fee stickiness.

Managers, seeking economic benefits, maintain a high level of cash. Additional cash exacerbates agency problems between shareholders and managers; meanwhile auditors, in order to decrease audit risk related to cash holdings, demand more audit fees by more audit efforts. The current research, aimed to investigate the relationship between cash holdings and audit fees and also examine the role of growth opportunities in the relationship. In this study, the financial information of 65 companies listed in Tehran stock exchange during the period of 2006-2015 has been examined. The results from testing the research hypotheses indicated that there is a significantly positive relationship between cash holdings and audit fees, suggesting that higher level of cash holdings requires more audit efforts and in turn, higher audit fees. The other results suggested that both high and low growth opportunities of firms strengthen the relationship. In fact, due to the emergence of agency conflict resulting from cash holdings, their audit becomes difficult, and opportunistic behavior, especially in firms characterized by high growth level, increase managers’ activities toward gaining their goals and maintaining their positions, and finally, audit fees are increased due to auditors’ efforts.

Large audit fee can create economical dependence between auditor and clients. Because auditors may represent a clean report to maintain clients and earn more audit fees. This may cause a doubt on auditor's independence. In this paper, we have determined the impact of audit fee on unqualified audit report over a 9- period from 2002 to 2010 in 144 firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange. Research method is correlation and hypotheses test are done by logistic regression. Findings of our research show that, audit fee has a positive relation with unqualified audit report. The results of this study also show firm size, loss report and firm age affect on unqualified audit report. Another variables such as auditor change, auditor type and auditor tenure don't affect on unqualified audit report.

This paper purports to analyze imposing registration fees on that part of Mahr higher than a certain level (Mahr Sunnah) from an economic perspective. The proponents of this plan believe that high Mahr is a main obstacle for young men’s marriage, and in the case occurring, it can lead to various kinds of social costs. So, it should be deterred by imposing a tax on it. This plan only considers the benefits of one part of marriage (men) and ignores the benefits of the other side (women). So, it can disturb the marriage market and leads to other kinds of social costs that might be even relatively higher. The incentive mechanism of this plan encourages the substitution of Mahr by other provisions in the marriage contract such as asking for divorce right by women, marital properties equal division, out-of-formal wedlock arrangements that are non-recognizable by the law as Mahr, and even leaving the marriage market for other counterparts such as cohabitation; all of them rise the transaction costs of marriage and might increase the average age at first marriage and decrease the likelihood of fertility.